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The Law, Nuclear Weapons and the Real
World
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY*
The topic on which I am addressing you goes to the very heart of the
paradox which faces our generation. How is it that in this age when the
world of knowledge has at its service more power for 'good than ever
before in human history, the real world is closer to destroying itself and
its environment than it has ever been?
One would have thought that knowledge was the road to an improve-
ment of the human condition and that technology, which knowledge pro-
duced, was the prime tool for this purpose. The real world in which we
live presents the opposite picture - that knowledge is showing the road
to a slide towards destruction and that technology in the form of nuclear
weapons is the prime tool that knowledge has fashioned for this purpose.
Where does the law come into this paradoxical relationship between
the theory that knowledge is a bounteous provider and the reality that it
has become the ultimate destroyer?
Law is the great reconciler, harnessing, to the service of justice and
human welfare, power which might otherwise careen uncontrolled. It
polices the departures from such norms. It reaches all departments of
human life and no sector, however powerful, is above the law. Is nuclear
power so powerful that it is above the law? Is there no law that regulates
it, or if there is, are nuclear weapons too powerful for that law? If there is
no law that regulates them, is it because this dimension of power is so
awesome that the law in this instance recoils from its habitual role and
admits its incapacity?
This is the challenge with which the International Association of
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) is confronted. It is for
IALANA to demonstrate that the law does exist in this awesome field,
that it is powerful enough to cope with nuclear weapons, and that there
are persbnnel, institutions, concepts and procedures adequate to the task.
We have throughout the ages been familiar with the maxim that no
person is above the law. Emperors and kings have been reminded from
time to time by lawyers, religious teachers and the sheer force of histori-
cal events that those who seek to override the law do so at their peril. For
our problem, the proposition must be restated in the form that no power
is above the law. It may be power so great as to be able to destroy our
planet. Yet the law is more powerful than that power, and if it is not
* Sir Hayden Stark Professor of International Law, Monarch University, Australia;
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already, we must inquire why it is not and must make it so.
In the field of nuclear weapons more than in almost any other field,
there is a powerful collision between theory and reality, and that is per-
haps the reason why the organizers of this conference, in their wisdom,
have placed this particular topic on our agenda.
Where then is the law that in this real world dominated by material-
istic forces can surmount such power and tame it to the social purposes of
humanity?
Unperceived by most citizens, that law is found everywhere, both
within national legal systems and on the international plane. It is found
in the realm of substantive law and in the realm of procedure. Its concep-
tual roots can be traced in the most ancient legal philosophies and its
practical justifications in the most modern scientific researches.
The fault is not in the law but perhaps in ourselves that we are not
sufficiently conscious of its presence or, indeed, of its power. If one were
to pursue this question of fault even further, one would find the finger of
accusation pointing in a special way to those who are the custodians of
the law - lawyers and judges. They have perhaps immersed themselves
so deeply in the real world of profits and power as to lose sight of the
greater realities confronting our age. Indeed, the legality (or otherwise) of
nuclear weapons is perhaps the greatest legal question confronting our
age, and yet for a quarter century after the first use of nuclear weapons in
war there was a singular dearth of legal discussion of this all-important
question. There were notable exceptions such as Schwarzenberger's, The
Legality of Nuclear Weapons,' and Nagendra Singh's, Nuclear Weapons
and International Law, 2 but on the whole, there was a neglect of this
problem.
A central theme of this paper will be that the law is already there,
waiting to be acknowledged and to be applied. It is our task at this world
symposium to exhibit it to view so that both the legal fraternity and
others - scientists, politicians and ordinary citizens - can use it more
purposefully, annexing nuclear power to its domain in the same way as
great events of the past, such as the Magna Carta3 and the Declaration on
the Rights of Man,4 have annexed the domains of kings within the law's
empire.
My task of analyzing law and nuclear weapons in the context of the
real world requires me, preliminarily, to note in general terms a few of the
varying dimensions of reality that become pertinent to the problem. We
have realities at the level of the politician - the political realities, na-
tional and international, in the midst of which we live. We also have
1. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958).
2. N. SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959).
3. See generally A. PALLISTER, MAGNA CARTA: THE HERITAGE OF LIBERTY (1971).
4. See generally G. JELLINEK, THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITI-
ZENS: A CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN CONSTrTUTIONAL HISTORY (1979).
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physical realities which condition our very existence on this planet - of
which political realities sometimes lose sight. These are assuming dimen-
sions in our age which were never known before. Economic realities, such
as money spent on armaments which diverts wealth and resources from
the problem of poverty, are also particularly pertinent to the nuclear
problem. While poverty is in the process of destroying hundreds of mil-
lions of lives on this planet, we have spent and are preparing to spend
trillions of dollars on nuclear arms. We need also to consider what may be
described as nuclear reality (i.e., the contrast between the mundane reali-
ties driving the nuclear weapons enterprise today and the idealism which
gave it birth). Finally, social realities - the driving forces of power,
profit, and prestige - must be addressed.
At all these levels of reality, nuclear weapons make a very real im-
pact. Our comprehension of each one of them would be vastly different
depending on whether we contemplate them in the context of a nuclear or
a non-nuclear world.
After some general observations in regard to each of these levels of
reality, I shall observe some notable contrasts between the world of the-
ory and the world of reality in some selected areas especially pertinent to
nuclear weapons.
I. A PRELIMINARY SURVEY
A. Political Reality
The world of realpolitik has always been concerned with the sheer
pursuit of power. In the world of realpolitik people, the principal actors,
lay aside their humanity and play the game of power as a chess player
plays the game of chess. Victory is the only objective. Participants can be
sacrificed for they are no more than chessmen who can be given away if
need be, en masse, if only one's opponent's king can be checkmated. Ar-
mies on the battlefield are not very different from inanimate weaponry
such as cannons and tanks. They are all tallied up in a common ledger,
the humans dehumanized, the weapons anthropomorphized into living re-
alities which are the equivalent of thousands of humans.
Checkmating your opponent's king has enormous advantages. Your
opponent is wiped off the map. Your own forces may be decimated but
you are left sovereign over the field of battle, free to order it thereafter
without let or hindrance from the enemy. The model of the chessboard
translates very easily into the model of the battlefield. Your legions may
have been cut to pieces, but your enemy is at your feet, his possessions
yours for the taking, his economy at your disposal.
Underlying all of this is the assumption that like the magic of the
chessboard, a whole new army can be brought into commission for the
next battle as though the decimation of the last one was irrelevant. Thus
far in warfare, these illusions of the chessboard have to a large extent
held true. The victor, with all the strengths and fruits of victory, could
soon field another army and reasonably hope to vanquish another foe.
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Nuclear weapons have changed political reality beyond recognition.
They have made such games irrelevant to real life. There is no longer an
endless supply of revitalized chessmen nor a succession of games. The
chessmen are extinguished and a new law ordains that only one game can
be played. What is left on the chessboard will be a theoretically victorious
but decimated army and a vanquished king. The victorious army will
have no spoils to enjoy and no new battles to fight except its own battle
for survival in the harsh world of nuclear winter. The ruler who plays the
game of nuclear chess would have played his last game, whether he
''wins" or "loses."
The world of make believe which lay beneath the so-called world of
reality is gone forever and the world of reality, shorn of make-believe,
stands exposed in all its starkness. The world of realpolitik could play out
its games only against a framework of potential replenishment. When
that framework is gone, so is the game.
In the past the most massive destroyers of human life and the envi-
ronment, such as Genghis Khan or Attila, could kill and destroy to the
limit of their ability but the reservoirs of human life and earth resources
would be refilled. Realpolitik had a meaning. The next game of chess
could be played. That scenario is gone forever.
B. Physical Reality
As the "realities" of politics are stripped of their illusions, the reali-
ties of physics and chemistry take over. Increasingly, our political and
geopolitical thinking reflects an awareness of the physical laws which cir-
cumscribe human activity - an awareness which could be kept at a dis-
tance so long as the scale of human activity did not approach those cir-
cumscribing boundaries.
Today we are face to face with those physical realities because we
stand at the interface between humanity's expanding capabilities and na-
ture's limiting constraints. Physical realities thus limit our thinking in a
manner not known to the generati ons that preceded us. In fairness to
those generations, however, we must observe that though they did not
stand at the interface as we do, they still had the wisdom to foresee that
if and when humanity arrived at that interface it would be almost too late
to stand back. They advocated then, in a manner which would have stood
us in good stead now, a harmony with the forces of nature rather than a
confrontation with them. Had we heeded these voices of wisdom, we
would not now be in the predicament in which we find ourselves.
The days of the boundless ocean and the boundless atmosphere, able
to absorb without feeling all the toxins we could deposit in them, are
gone. As we stand at this significant interface, we search around desper-
ately for new principles by which to govern our international conduct.
The paradox is that those principles have long been with us though we
have refused to recognize or apply them.
When the concept of the nuclear winter emerged in 1982 with the
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pioneering researches of P.J. Crutzen and J.W. Birks, this reality was un-
veiled in all its starkness and in a form so powerful that even govern-
ments and armies dedicated to the nuclear weapons enterprise were com-
pelled to take note that a nuclear war could kill a billion humans at first
blast, two billion in its after-effects, alter climatic conditions by blotting
out the sunlight, destroy agriculture and reduce humanity to its most
primitive level since the stone age.
C. Economic Reality
Economic realities can be as crippling as political realities, economic
subjection as harsh as political subjection and economic aggression as vi-
cious as armed attack.
The economic reality facing the world today is that more than 2.5
billion dollars a day are spent on fueling the world's armaments establish-
ment. A hundred million dollars an hour, or over a million dollars a min-
ute flow down the drain of negativity so far as human welfare is con-
cerned. A day's expenditure on armaments would eradicate malaria or lift
ten million lives out of the trough of starvation, but this is not our chosen
option. Visitors from outer space would no doubt marvel at our sense of
priorities, but that is economic reality today.
It has now been universally accepted by scholars in the field of
human rights and development that there is an intrinsic linkage between
development and the arms race. This linkage rests upon the economic
reality that in a world of scarce resources the absorption of trillions of
dollars by the arms race is one of the principal factors inhibiting the right
to development.
We need to remind ourselves of the landmark event which occurred
on 4 December 1986 when the General Assembly adopted the Declaration
on the Right to Development,' which viewed development as an "inalien-
able right." If this be so, the economic reality of the nuclear arms race is
one of the most potent forces denying this basic human right to vast sec-
tions of the earth's population.
D. Nuclear Reality
Nuclear weapons research started as an idealistic venture in the
minds of many scientists. Their memoirs reveal that the news that Ger-
many was conducting research in this field provided several of them with
powerful impetus to produce the weapon before it could fall into the
hands of one of the most monstrous tyrannies that had yet appeared. One
of them wrote: "[T]here was not for a long time in history any worse
aberration of human conduct and human monstrosity than the Nazi re-
gime in Germany. And the idea of an atomic bomb that could win the war
5. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp.
Annex (No. 53) at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
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against Germany was highly attractive to me. While nothing required me
to work more than eight hours a day, I spent at least sixteen in the aver-
age day on the bomb project. I was highly motivated simply because I
thought it was important to win the war against Germany." There were
many more like this writer, for example Leo Szilard, who wrote: "During
the war, while we worked on the bomb, we scientists thought for a while
that we were in a neck and neck race against the Germans and that get-
ting the bomb first might make a difference between winning and losing
the war."'
But it soon became clear that Germany was not in the race to pro-
duce the bomb. The capitulation of Germany made the defeat of Nazi
tyranny no longer an issue. The bomb continued, however, to be the sub-
ject of research despite the disappearance of the earlier idealism which
fueled the nuclear effort. Its use against Japan was a significant fall away
from the initial idealism. Continued research after the capitulation of Ja-
pan meant that the objective of defeating a particularly monstrous tyr-
anny had now been superseded by the much more mundane motive of
providing a weapon for the U.S. to use against its enemies. It also gave
the U.S. a nuclear monopoly over the rest of the world.
Finally, when the bomb ceased to be a monopoly, the ideology behind
its production changed dramatically again, and the nuclear arms race be-
gan. There was no longer the pursuit of ideals in the production of the
bomb. In the real world of the post-war era that initial idealism had dis-
appeared. In the nuclear weapons field as elsewhere the reality was that
the powers were pursuing interests and not ideals. The scientists, on
whose expertise the entire enterprise depended, had forgotten their ideal-
ism and were lending their expertise to the pursuit of national interests
rather than universal ideals. The Nuremberg Principles,' which all na-
tions accepted at the end of the war, dictated that crimes against human-
ity were prohibited however much they promoted national interests. In
such matters, universalism prevailed over nationalism. In the nuclear
weapons enterprise, the real world of politicians, officials, soldiers and
scientists has forgotten the Nuremberg Principles which are an integral
part of international law.
E. Social Reality
We need to face the fact that there is a solid wall of opposition to the
abolition of nuclear weapons coming from various interested sources -
those who derive profit, power or prestige from the nuclear weapons
establishment.
6. L. FREEMAN, NUCLEAR WITNESSES: INSIDERS SPEAK OUT 83 (1981).
7. L. Szilard, A Personal History of the Bomb, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUNDTABLE,
Sep. 15, 1949, at 14.
8. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal (International Law Commission), 5 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 12), at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316, (1950) [hereinafter the Nuremberg Principles].
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Who are those who derive profit, power or prestige from these weap-
ons that can fling all living systems and cultures into oblivion? They can
be analyzed under the three headings I have mentioned.
1. Profit
The profit motive has throughout history proved to be so powerful
that even the certain knowledge that millions of deaths will result has not
deterred those who pursue it. This statement is best illustrated through
the armaments industry which, in all ages of modern history, richly docu-
ments the fact that where there is profit to be made the fact that such
profit is achieved at the cost of human lives seems irrelevant.
Great commercial houses that made the lethal weapons through
which the killing of humans has been reduced to a fine art have flourished
since the industrial revolution. They are indeed among the most
respected businesses in their respective countries, and their clients are
their own and foreign governments, not to mention terrorist movements
and protagonists in civil wars. The whole world flocks to the arms fairs
they stage like great carnivals of death while the petty drug trafficker is
hunted down in the side-streets of the city.
The nuclear weapons industry is but a sophisticated extension of the
traditional armaments industry, multiplying several fold the scale of
profit resulting from its operations. It is true that this industry does not
have foreign customers in an open marketplace of weapons, but the scale
of profit to be derived from a nuclear weapons contract is such as to take
it almost beyond the dreams of avarice. Nuclear weapons manufacturers
talk in billions rather than millions of dollars, and they seek to convince
both rulers and the military that the level of expenditure must constantly
be stepped up in the interest of national security.
Nearly a quarter century ago, President Kennedy addressed himself
to the question of the alleged megaton gap between the U.S. and the So-
viet Union in a radio and television interview. He was asked for his reac-
tion to a newspaper advertisement of the Douglas Company urging a 2.5
billion dollar program for a nuclear delivery system. The President de-
tailed the existing missile systems and said: "There is just a limit to how
much we need, as well as how much we can afford, to have a successful
deterrent. I would say when we start to talk about the megatonage we
could bring into a nuclear war, we are talking about annihilation. How
many times do you have to hit a target with nuclear weapons? That is
why when we are talking about spending the 2.5 billion dollars, we don't
think we are going to get 2.5 billion dollars worth of security."9
The possible destruction of the ecosystem and the prospects of a nu-
clear winter are no more a deterrent than the millions of deaths resulting
from the use of conventional weapons. Indeed, in the nuclear weapons
9. J. WILEY, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR 490 (1985).
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enterprise, there are many salves to the conscience apart from patriotism
and self-defense, which are the traditional defenses of the arms manufac-
turer. In the case of nuclear weaponry, we have the ever attractive argu-
ment of deterrence - the makers of the weapon, far from perfecting the
means of exterminating populations, are in fact said to be saving billions
of lives and lifting the scourge of war from suffering humanity. The enter-
prise is therefore said to be so laudable that constraints upon it would
indeed be counterproductive so far as national welfare is concerned.
There is also another species of profit associated with the nuclear
weapons enterprise. Nuclear weapons are the livelihood of many who
have been trained specifically for their production. Ask any scientist in
the nuclear weapons enterprise whether he or she would not rather devote
his or her talents to something more humane and you will often receive
the answer that society has trained him expressly for this purpose, guided
him towards a Ph.D. in nuclear physics, and thence into the weapons es-
tablishment. Society shaped his training in such a way that he is unsuited
for any other occupation. If any blame is to be attached to his means of
earning a livelihood, it is society that must be blamed and not himself.
The author has often received this response from scientists he has ques-
tioned on the moral aspects of their work. The trained nuclear weapons
scientist thus has a vested interest in the continuance of the enterprise
and he or she will not easily be persuaded to look elsewhere or to lower
his or her living standards through devotion to moral imperatives.
The same applies to the thousands who depend for their livelihood
on the nuclear weapons establishment. No doubt there exists in many of
these cases a lack of specialization that the nuclear scientist enjoys, but
for them it is a livelihood. One would often prefer to continue in a secure
occupation, salving one's conscience by convincing oneself of the moral
rectitude of the enterprise, rather than taking the uncomfortable decision
to opt out.
The military establishment is another sharer in the profits of the nu-
clear enterprise. Here too, is a considerable addition of privileges to the
ordinary rewards of a military career. Among these are specialized em-
ployment and a high level of influence with the government and with the
multi-billion dollar enterprises that produce the weapons. A specialized
cadre of officers and enlisted personnel trained particularly for the enter-
prise also represent an additional nucleus of full time servants to the
weapons enterprise, dedicated to its service and its success.
2. Power
Nuclear weapons are of course a source of power. Governments seek
them as a multiplier of the powers they wield through conventional arms.
Indeed, nuclear capability by itself can theoretically even displace the
need for conventional weapons, so great is the power these weapons bring
to their holders.
The power in question is primarily military power, but with military
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power comes an expansion of political power. The known possessor of nu-
clear weaponry commands many multiples of bargaining power as com-
pared with the position of one that holds only conventional weapons. The
nuclear weapons do not have to be used. They lie in the background but
give stentorian tones to the voices of their owners at the bargaining table.
Enough said in relation to the power of governments; this is a point
too obvious to need elaboration. However, nuclear weapons also give
power to those who have anything to do with them - defense contrac-
tors, the military establishment, and research workers included. They
proceed about their daily business with an aura of special importance
that no other weaponry can match. They have access to the corridors of
political power and are privy to the secrets of governments. The finances
involved in their activities are also at such a level that association with
them in any way adds another dimension of power to the world in which
they live.
There is also domestic political power in the nuclear weapons enter-
prise for the enterprise means tens of thousands of jobs and every job
represents a vote. The political systems (and the economic systems) of
many states in the U.S. are heavily dependent on the weapons establish-
ment, and the same can be said of power realities in other countries.
The nuclear weapons lobby is immensely powerful, and in Washing-
ton, as in other centers of power, the weapons enterprise, with vast funds
at its disposal, has the ear of senators and representatives in a manner
which the anti-nuclear movement cannot match. As for the military lead-
ers themselves, their power keeps expanding as the nuclear weapons en-
terprise expands. With nuclear weapons, a static state means a state of
lack-lustre. New contingencies must be envisaged and new plans made,
for these mean expansion of power. Helen Caldicott in her book Missile
Envy"0 suggests that such attitudes are a result of both commitment to
nuclear weapons and frustration at the knowledge that with the inclusion
of nuclear weapons, proper wars in the sense leaders are accustomed to
can no longer be fought. Hence, they indulge in the fascination of and
drive to build and experiment with more and more complicated technol-
ogy and weapons systems which, of course, are enormously expensive.
These are some of the psychological factors which operate in the real
world where power and prestige are such real motivating factors.
3. Prestige
The nuclear weapons business is a business of high prestige. Every-
thing associated with it is prestigious - position, privilege, finances, se-
crecy, all go with it. All sharers in the enterprise are partakers in this
bounty of benefits.
In the socialist world, where private profit is not to be made out of
10. H. CALDICOrT, MISSILE ENVY: THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR WAR (1985).
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the weapons enterprise, the element of prestige no doubt provides a sub-
stitute for all of those in the establishment, military as well as non-mili-
tary, who are linked with the nuclear weapons enterprise, and who enjoy
a special aura of prestige.
Vested interests thus stand at every point in support of the nuclear
weapons enterprise. Their combination of industrial-military-financial-
bureaucratic strength presents too solid a phalanx for easy penetration.
Do we have the weaponry with which to pierce this wall of protection?
My answer is in the affirmative. We have that weapon, and that
weapon is the law. Strong enough by itself, it has been reinforced in re-
cent years by scientific research which spells the end of civilization, of
life-styles, and of life itself if the nuclear enterprise proceeds unabated.
That reality combines with the law to spell the doom of nuclear weapons.
This is the single central theme of this paper, and it rests on a principle
so powerful that it must prevail in the face of even the most concerted
opposition that vested interests can mount.
II. SOME SPECIFIC CONTRASTS
A. Contrasts Between the Real World and Nuclear Weapons Treaties
We have not thus far been able to procure a treaty which bans nu-
clear weapons outright but we have had a series of partial successes. Each
of these is, no doubt, a great achievement and is cause for congratula-
tions, but we must not be so carried away by these treaties as to lose sight
of the real world of nuclear danger that exists despite them.
In this paper, we shall not be able to cover the field of nuclear trea-
ties completely but will use two of them as illustrations.
1. The I.N.F. Treaty of 8 December 198711
This is no doubt a landmark event as it represents the first signifi-
cant move towards de-escalation and the cessation of the arms race. It is
also significant as the first effective reduction of a whole category of nu-
clear weapons rather than an effort at merely controlling their numbers.
Yet these great achievements must not cause us to lose sight of real-
ity. Let us not be carried away by the treaty, for without more steps in
that direction it means very little. The elimination of 859 U.S. and 1,752
Soviet missiles over three years represents no more than four percent
(4%) of the nuclear arsenals of the powers in question. Unless more sig-
nificant reductions follow, this will remain in reality no more than merely
a token gesture. Indeed, unless we keep these proportions in perspective,
we could lull ourselves into a false sense of security that the nuclear
11. Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, 88
DEPT. STATE BULL. 24 (Feb. 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988) [hereinafter I.N.F.
Treaty].
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weapons threat is on the way out. Such attitudes are already visible
among lawyers and the general public and provide a formidable obstacle
to the work of organizations such as IALANA.
We have yet to see how this treaty works. For too long we have wit-
nessed the sad reality that even the most well-intentioned treaties can be
defeated and in fact circumvented or evaded through a lack of willingness
to abide by their spirit. Perhaps the best illustration of this is offered by
the celebrated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1 July 1968"2
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was aimed at ending
both the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nuclear
powers and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-
nuclear powers. It was a momentous step forward and should have spelled
the beginning of the end of the arms race.
Yet the reality was that in the first decade of its existence the total
number of nuclear warheads in the superpowers' arsenals tripled, rising
from 5,800 to 16,000. By 1988, they had perhaps increased an additional
fifty percent (50%) to 24,000. The reality was far from the undertaking
contained in Article 6 of the treaty which intended to negotiate an early
end to the arms race.
Not only was the number of weapons increased, but also the quality
and capacity for geographical deployment. So also was the ability in-
creased to use the oceans as launching grounds, for of the combined U.S./
USSR total of around 4,000 strategic ballistic missiles, at least one-third
are deployed at sea.
The world of hope surrounding the NPT expected a reduction in nu-
clear weaponry as its outcome. The real world in which the treaty has
functioned has seen no commitment to an ending of the arms race, but
instead both a vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The INF treaty made a dent in this world of reality but only a minor
dent, easily reversible if its momentum is not sustained.
We have fears that more countries are on the verge of nuclear weap-
onry, and the fear has even been expressed that terrorist groups, who evi-
dently have enormous funds at their disposal, are also potential posses-
sors of crude nuclear weapons. This is the world of reality which contrasts
so strongly with the principles on which the NPT is based.
B. Contrasts Between the Real World And The Theory That Oceans
Are a Common Resource of Humanity
Legal and human rights theory teaches us that the high seas are a
common resource of humanity. The vast maritime reaches of our planet
12. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Jul. 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No.
6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 809 (1968) [hereinafter NPT].
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which lie beyond coastal waters and exclusive economic zones are the
common property of the whole human family, for all to enjoy and use.
That use must presumably be for peaceful purposes and not for the de-
struction of the human species - least of all for the destruction of the
vast majority of humankind who are not party to the quarrels of the nu-
clear powers.
Yet what is the reality? There are some 5,900 tactical nuclear war-
heads available for use by the naval forces of the nuclear powers to strike
ships, submarines, planes and land targets.13 Submarine launched ballis-
tic missiles (SLBMs) of the Soviet Union and the U.S. have the potential
to destroy the major cities of both countries several times over. In de-
stroying these cities, we would launch a nuclear winter upon the entire
population of the globe - the very owners of the common resource,
namely the high seas, from which their destruction was launched.
A Trident submarine carrying 24 Trident missiles, each of which has
eight 100 kiloton warheads, would have a grand total of 192 warheads.
Each of these could be separately targeted, thus making a Trident com-
mander "the third most powerful man in the world" according to Robert
C. Aldridge, a former Lockheed engineer."
Another problem in this regard is the deliberate refusal of nuclear
weapons-states to reveal whether their battleships carry or do not carry
nuclear weapons. It is, for example, a deliberate U.S. policy to refuse to
confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board their vessels,
thus rendering it difficult for non-nuclear states to decide on an appropri-
ate course of action in relation to them.
The oceans then are put to the most lethal purpose which human-
kind has devised. This is an abuse of basic principles so strong that it
needs to be violently condemned on the basis of legal principle, and
IALANA could perhaps address this issue. The use of the oceans for nu-
clear weapons launching is no different in principle from the use of outer-
space for this purpose. Yet we condone it with scarcely a protest, save for
comparatively feeble attempts to establish nuclear-free zones and zones
of peace.
C. Contrasts Between the Real World and the Theory That Only
Heads of State Can Launch a Nuclear War
We have seen in our discussion of Trident submarines how a single
Trident commander has at his fingertips the power to launch nuclear
weapons in such quantity as to amount to a major nuclear war. This will
no doubt provoke a major nuclear response from the power attacked, with
all the potential of triggering a nuclear winter.
13. See Study on the Naval Arms Race, U.N. Doc. A/40/535 at 28 f 1985).
14. Aldridge, First Strike Breakout in 1988, GROUND ZERO, Dec. 1983-Jan. 1984, at 1.
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According to an authority on nuclear armaments, 5 there is a growing
number of officers in the military chains of command among the nuclear
weapons powers who are empowered to decide on the use of nuclear
weapons in case of attack. These are officers at the operational tactical
level - a level far removed from the head of state who theoretically alone
enjoys the right to decide on the use of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, the time scale available for this decision keeps decreasing
with improvements in the sophistication of nuclear weaponry; decisions
would have to be taken in minutes - far less time than would be needed
to awaken either President if he should happen to be in bed at the crucial
moment. The decision not to use weapons and to stay passive and suffer
the risk of losing one's whole arsenal of nuclear weaponry, or to strike
back, is a crucial one and can in no circumstances be delayed.
To this must be added the Launch on Warning Capability (LOWC)
which in many cases means that this decision is taken by a computer
without human intervention at the moment of decision. The possibility of
grave error resulting from malfunctioning machines is ever-present, and
the record of near accidents in the past is so serious as to merit careful
consideration.
As one United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR) Study entitled Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War"6 tells us,
the crucial factor affecting the propensity of a system to produce uninten-
tional nuclear war is the urgency with which the decision must be made.
If the forces enabling retaliation are vulnerable to sudden destruction, the
deterrent threat can be removed by a preemptive attack. This can only be
prevented by an immediate and urgent decision during the vital minutes
when the attacking missiles are on their way. Where, in reality, is the
time for a Presidential decision?
D. Contrasts Between The Real World And The Theory That Nuclear
Weapons Or Know-How Must Not Be Exchanged Between States
There is a theory, enshrined in Articles I and II of the NPT,17 that
there should be no transfer between states of nuclear weapons or assis-
tance in weapons technology. However, the phraseology of the two articles
read in the context of the general tenor of the Treaty seems to concen-
trate on the prohibition of transfer between nuclear states and non-nu-
clear states rather than among nuclear states inter se. Consequently,
transfer of nuclear weapons or know-how as between two nuclear states
(e.g., the U.S. and Britain), does not seem in reality to attract the same
level of prohibition (notwithstanding the use of Article I of the expression
15. Subrahmanyan, The Link Between Horizontal and Vertical Proliferation, in Nu-
CLEAR WAR, PROLIFERATION AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 136 (A. Kahn ed. 1986).
16. D. FREI, RISKS OF UNINTENTIONAL NUCLEAR WAR 5 (1982).
17. NPT, supra note 12.
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"to any recipient whatsoever").8 Thus a primary purpose of the treaty,
namely the prevention of such transfer, is defeated.
An important reason for the geographical proliferation of nuclear
weapons is the apparent freedom of the nuclear weapons-states to posi-
tion nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear states. It is possible
to argue that this too is contrary to the spirit if not the letter of Articles I
and II, but the real world of NATO and the Warsaw Pact flies in the face
of such a principle.
In addition, the Treaty does not stand in the way of non-nuclear
states such as Australia extending their active cooperation to nuclear
states in technological cooperation (for example, by providing tracking
stations which assist in the nuclear weapons enterprise). Such assistance
is a real, indeed an indispensable, aid to the maintenance of the nuclear
weapons enterprise and without it the enterprise would need to be con-
ducted on a truncated scale. Yet this is what the real world offers the
nuclear weapons enterprise despite principles and protestations to the
contrary.
E. Contrasts Between The Real World And The Theoretical Freedom
Of Non-Nuclear Powers To Desist From Participation In The Nuclear
Weapons Enterprise
Non-nuclear powers may perhaps be divided into three categories.
There are those, on the one hand, who are part of the two military alli-
ances that are underpinned by nuclear power - NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. Secondly, there are countries which are thought to be on the verge
of achieving nuclear capability. The third category comprises countries
which have no interest at all in the nuclear weapons enterprise and wish
to distance themselves as far as possible from nuclear weapons, their
manufacture, testing and tracking.
The majority of the world's nation states are in this third category.
They are, in the real world, the passive victims of the nuclear weapons
enterprise. However, whether they desire it or not, they provide the test-
ing grounds for nuclear explosions and often the harbors for nuclear ves-
sels. The Pacific Islands and New Zealand provide examples respectively
of the two categories. The devastation caused to the natural environment
of the former and the economic sanctions applied to the latter when it
decided to ban the entry of nuclear vessels into its ports illustrate how in
reality there is often no true option to keep one's hands off the nuclear
weapons enterprise.
Moreover, even when the countries of this latter group desire to take
active steps against the nuclear weapons enterprise, there are often un-
seen barriers to such a course of action. Perhaps the best example lies in
the fact that although for some years now lawyers who are campaigning
18. Id. (Emphasis added).
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for the outlawing of nuclear weapons have tried hard to find a nation to
sponsor a resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations seek-
ing an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the
illegality of nuclear weapons, they have not been able to persuade even
one state to come forward with such a proposition. The reason is not diffi-
cult to find. In varying measure, they are afraid to take the initiative in a
matter that can attract many powerful sanctions from nuclear weapons
powers. Many countries would vote for such a resolution if a proposer
could be found. Nearly every state is in reality a client state of some nu-
clear power and knows too well the sanctions which, in the real world, will
accompany such independent action.
It is important to mention that IALANA's objectives include ob-
taining such an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ, and it is to be hoped that
with the incentive given to this proposal by IALANA and the present
convention there will be success in the near future in finding a sponsor.
F. Contrasts Between the Real World and the Theory of Deterrence
The theory of nuclear deterrence is the theory most often pro-
pounded as a justification for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The
manufacture of these weapons, we are led to understand, is almost a be-
nign enterprise, for it has kept the world away from nuclear war for forty-
five years. Nuclear weapons manufacture, far from being a means of de-
stroying the planet, is indeed, from this point of view, a project that helps
to keep the peace.
At any rate, such is the theory. But is it matched by conditions in the
real world? In the real world, in which nuclear weapons will or will not be
used, the reality is that weapons produced for deterrence are used as bar-
gaining counters with no intention of using them in the last resort.
If there is no intention to use them in the last resort, one is only
playing a game of bluff with one's opponent. Such a bluff cannot be main-
tained for all ensuing time. Sooner or later one's opponent will call one's
bluff. One cannot persuade one's opponent that nuclear weapons will be
used in deterrence unless one really means to use them.
The manufacture of nuclear weapons with a view to deterrence is
nothing less than using them as a weapon of last resort. They are not
manufactured with a view to their being locked away for all time in a
closet. Thus, the real world intends, in the last resort, to use nuclear
weapons that are manufactured supposedly for deterrence. Such use will
annihilate both those who use them and those against whom they are
used. It is mutually assumed destruction (MAD) - no more and no less.
To think otherwise is to pull the wool over our eyes and to be blind to
reality.
Lest all that I have said thus far should present reality in a dim and
foreboding light, I hasten to brighten up the presentation of reality by
reference to some truly hopeful features of the real world.
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III. SOME HOPEFUL FEATURES OF REALITY
Having dealt at some length with the obstacles presented by the real
world, let us now see what factors in the real world operate to bring closer
the prospect that the international community will hold itself bound by
international law in relation to nuclear weapons.
A. Soviet Initiatives
Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction, and the change that has
come over the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the past few years
must be a good illustration of this adage. In fact, this is one of the nicest
aspects of reality we have seen manifested in our generation.
We now have in office a Soviet leader whose attitudes on a number of
matters bearing upon our subject are significantly different from those of
his predecessors. Among these are the following:
1. A recognition of the practical unsuitability of nuclear weapons for
military purposes;
2. a proclaimed resolve to end the regime of nuclear weapons by the
turn of the century;
3. an increasing recognition of and respect for international law and
its binding nature;
4. a recognition that with the proliferation of nuclear weapons there is
an ever-present danger of accidental war;
5. the idea of open discussion at all levels and on all topics concerning
Soviet society and government, including necessarily, the question of
the nuclear danger and the possibility of nuclear holocaust;
6. an acknowledgement that science and technology must be the ser-
vants of society, guiding it towards a richer future, rather than a dom-
inant influence holding society in its grip;
7. a consciousness of the need to pay attention to the diversion caused
by the arms race of scarce resources from much needed social welfare
projects;
8. a support for the concept that security comes from mutual under-
standing rather than unilateral superiority;
9. an acceptance that reasonable sufficiency of military forces is the
ideal to be arrived at, rather than military superiority;
10. the unprecedented notion that unilateral disarmament can be re-
sorted to by a major power without detriment to its security or
prestige;
11. a vision of a mutually supportive and inter-related world order of
the future in which all sections of global society play an interlocking
role;
12. an emphasis upon the vital need for humanity as a whole to ad-
dress the problem of environmental protection of planet Earth rather
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than for each nation to pursue selfishly the policies that are in its best
interests regardless of environmental repercussions; and
13. the recognition that imbalances in conventional forces such as So-
viet tank superiority must be rectified as a prelude to more effective
nuclear disarmament.
These factors in combination help considerably in transforming polit-
ical reality from the life-consuming and soulless concept it once was, into
a reality of hopefulness. For the first time in the post-war years, we are
perhaps able to say that hopefulness has entered the real world and be-
come part of it rather than being cloistered away in the wishful thinking
of philosophers and idealists. When we speak of political reality, there-
fore, we are no longer talking of a concept that we view with disdain, but
we are talking of a concept vibrant with possibilities for bettering the
human condition.
Political reformers have appeared in the world before, but few have
been able to transform the thinking of a generation regardless of their
political orientation, as Mr. Gorbachev has done, transmuting frustration
into hope.
Early products of that new spirit are the INF Treaty, 9 the concept
of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing, and the many speeches in which the Soviet leader has proclaimed
his antagonism to nuclear weapons and his abiding faith in the strength
of international law.
There is also a new and more relaxed attitude in the United States
under the Presidency of President Bush, which in itself has helped to
reduce international tensions. The declining priority given to such pro-
grams as "Star Wars" and the growing awareness of legislators and the
public that it can at best deliver only a minute fraction of the protection
it promised to offer, are other hopeful factors. Altered attitudes in the
U.S. towards the Soviet Union and a softening of the attitude of distrust
which once prevailed are also a very helpful feature of current realities.
Writers on nuclear weapons, including the present writer, have con-
tinually stressed the need to break the spiral of escalation which has kept
the nuclear weapons enterprise growing from stage to stage to reach a
situation where its very consumption of resources becomes a sort of can-
cer on the face of the planet. Escalation begets escalation, and so the spi-
ral ascends until a magic formula can be found to break the escalation. It
may be that the developments outlined above have provided that magic
formula, and that the ascending spiral has been broken. Unilateral action
can do this, for just as tension begets tension, relaxation of tension begets
relaxation.
When we speak of political realities we must not permit these hope-
ful aspects to pass unnoticed.
19. I.N.F. Treaty, supra note 11.
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B. Erosions of Sovereignty
There is another aspect to reality that inures to our benefit. That is
the erosion currently taking place in traditional attitudes towards the
concept of sovereignty. Many forces combine to bring about this result,
not the least of which is the reach of modern technology. Technology
knows no national barriers and requires concerted international action for
its handling.
As a consequence of this enormously expanded reach of modern tech-
nology, areas of sovereign power which the nation state would not have
dreamt of letting out of its grasp, are now willingly handed over in an
increasing number of fields to the regulation of an international control-
ling authority. Indeed, it is not merely in technical fields such as telecom-
munications or the prevention of atmospheric pollution that such interna-
tional cooperation is becoming increasingly visible. The foremost evidence
of this comes from the European Economic Community which is progres-
sively abandoning to the supranational control of the community topics
drawn from such fields as currency, trade and customs regulation.
This is a new internationalism - the internationalism of cooperation
rather than mere coexistence. We are realizing increasingly that the age is
past when different nations looked upon each other as necessary evils
with whom they had to coexist whether they liked it or not. Under the
pressures of our age we are forced into a spirit of positive cooperation
rather than negative tolerance - and cooperation means a willing accept-
ance of others as co-participants in a common enterprise - the enterprise
of managing spaceship earth which is the common home of all. Coexis-
tence is compatible with inimical states of mind towards each other. Co-
operation is not.
An attitude of cooperation immensely strengthens the arm of inter-
national law by strengthening the willingness of all to abide by its spirit
and its letter whereas the age of coexistence meant only unwilling accept-
ance out of sheer self-interest.
As international law grows stronger in this new climate, its ability to
curb the abuse of power - nuclear or otherwise - is likewise immeasura-
bly strengthened.
C. The Decline of the Superpowers
A potent factor altering international attitudes since the end of
World War II is the fact that we are today in a world where the super-
powers no longer dominate. The Soviet Union's economic weakness and
its inability to sustain the arms race at the present level show that the
power scenarios of the future will not be bipolar.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the U.S. was the world's
greatest power - militarily, economically, technologically and perhaps
ideologically. Alone among the victorious nations, it had not been deci-
mated by the war but was rising resurgent from it to take over the role of
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world leader. In the shattered remains of the post-war world, if one spoke
in terms of global administration one was speaking of an administration
on terms dictated by the United States.
No longer is this the case. We have been told that Japan has out-
stripped the United States in net wealth. The Soviet Union overtook the
U.S. in the race to outer space. Vietnam defeated the armed might of the
U.S. for the first time in the history of the Union. A united Europe is
poised to take its place alongside the superpowers as their equal if not
superior in wealth, trade and technology.
One can therefore talk of global regulation without the fear of domi-
nation by any one power. The inhibitions inherent in the oild frame of
discussion of global regulation have to a large extent melted away.
D. The Growing Authority of International Law
Against that background as well, the authority of international law
becomes all the stronger, for neither in content nor in administration is
there a danger that it will be heavily weighted in favor of the superpower
that dominated the immediate post-war world.
Moreover, in the past decade in particular, international law in rela-
tion to nuclear weapons has exhibited a dramatic resurgence of interest
with lawyers from all countries who have joined their voices in a common
call for the outlawing of nuclear weapons. Our current convention is per-
haps the best illustration of this. Moreover, this development is occurring
against a backdrop of a general revival and revitalization of international
law as a discipline.
In the aftermath of World War II there was a remarkable reluctance
on the part of international law and international lawyers to address the
question of the illegality of nuclear weapons. The U.S. was the one power
that had thus far used the nuclear weapon in war, and if international law
threw serious doubts on its legality the entire moral authority of the U.S.
would have been seriously undermined at that critical phase in world his-
tory. Such considerations combined with other fortuitous events such as
the Korean War and the cold war to direct attention from this important
problem of international law. Today those inhibitions no longer exist.
Time enough has passed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the world to
engage in a dispassionate appraisal of the legality or illegality of nuclear
weapons. The world order is not likely to be thrown into turmoil by a
consideration of this matter. Indeed, the time is propitious for doing so.
Reality thus favors rather than obstructs the consideration of this matter.
E. The Confluence of Global Perils
Other global dangers drive us into each other's arms. Environmental
dangers resulting from depletion of the ozone layer, deforestation of trop-
ical rain forests and industrial pollution causing acid rain are some of
these. New phenomena such as AIDS, which can be likened to medieval
pestilences which swept through continents, require concerted interna-
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tional effort. Drug trafficking and terrorism cannot be tackled by coun-
tries singly. The fact that the globe is inhabited by one interlocking soci-
ety is being emphasized and underlined in this age as never before.
United action calls for united regulation and universal norms. The
climate of respect for these is growing. Born on this tide of necessity to-
wards a regime of universal norms, humanity in this age finds that reality
is more on the side of international law than against it.
Students of international law have been taught in the past that but
for international law the pirates would rule the seas, airplanes would col-
lide in mid-air, letters would not be delivered beyond national bounda-
ries, and telecommunication would be impossible. To those realities of the
past have now been added a set of new realities, some of them grim and
some of them benign, but all of them so compelling that they cannot be
ignored.
We are not moving towards a world sovereign state. Our thinking has
become clearer on this issue. But we are inexorably moving towards a
world governed by international norms and the epitome of those norms is
the system of international law.
F. Universal Popular Movements
The past decade has witnessed the emergence, world wide, of a num-
ber of popular movements which aim at the preservation of our planet
without further injury to it and its life support systems.
Popular movements such as Greenpeace have demonstrated their
strength and a level of dedication to this cause which will not be deterred
by physical danger. Green movements throughout the world are becoming
a political force so significant that even hardened politicians who know
only the world of realpolitik are beginning to recognize their force. They
sway elections, make and unmake governments, stir the conscious of their
generation, and perform a valuable educational role whose full potential
has yet to be seen.
An important aspect of these popular movements is that they are
now beginning to make use of national and international law in the ordi-
nary judicial processes of their countries to assert the proposition that
nuclear weapons are illegal and a crime against humanity.
One of the most notable illustrations of this is the case presently
pending in the courts of Holland - 20,000 Plaintiffs v. The State of the
Netherlands.. The writ of summons was filed on behalf of the foundation
"Ban the Cruise Missiles." The writ of summons and the background ma-
terial have appeared in book form and the reader, anxious to discover the
grounds of illegality, will find in this book a most detailed discussion of
all the principal legal arguments.
Other protest cases have been filed in various jurisdictions, and there
is currently pending in Australia an income tax claim made against a tax-
payer who refuses to pay on the basis that a substantial part of his tax
VOL. 19:1
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE REAL WORLD
dollar is used by the Australian Government for supporting the nuclear
weapons enterprise.
The groundswell of popular protest is thus gathering strength and
will soon be a force which legislators in all countries must reckon with. In
the countries of the Eastern bloc the new spirit of perestroika and glas-
nost will also give more opportunity for the average citizen to register his
or her opposition to the nuclear weapons enterprise.
IV. THE ILLEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
It is not the purpose of this paper to examine at length the question
of the illegality of nuclear weapons. Sufficient literature has already ap-
peared on this aspect to make such information readily available.
A. Domestic Legal Systems
There are numerous possibilities within each legal system to urge the
question of illegality, whether on the basis of violation of international
law simpliciter, the violation of human rights to which the country's legal
system is committed, on the basis of constitutional provisions, or on the
basis of principles embedded in the legal system. The variety of ways in
which this can be done will come as a surprise to most lawyers practicing
in domestic forums, and one of the vital purposes this congress can serve
is to alert the international legal community to the variety of procedures
and forums available for taking up these issues. Professor Francis Boyle's
trail-blazing book, Defending Civil Resistance Under International
Law,2" explores these possibilities in detail. It shows the relevance of in-
ternational law to the paradox of nuclear deterrence and sets out a range
of trial materials on nuclear weapons and international law. The case of
20,000 Plaintiffs Against the Government of the Netherlands is another
notable source of a wide range of arguments that can be urged in domes-
tic forums.
In short, the law is there and the only reason why it has not been
used is that lawyers are unfamiliar with it as it falls outside the beaten
track of their normal professional activities.
It was the sense of frustration induced by this failure that urged
George Delf to write his incisive book, Humanizing Hell: The Law v. Nu-
clear Weapons,2' in which he castigates the profession for failing to trans-
late into domestic legal systems the principles of the Nuremberg trials
which, if properly applied in ordinary domestic forums, could well have
obstructed the preparations for nuclear war by countries with a commit-
ment to the observance of principles of international law.
It is perhaps the task of IALANA to sensitize professionals all over
the world and show the way. The materials to be used are those showing
20. F. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
21. G. DELF, HUMANIZING HELL: THE LAW v. NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1985).
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in what way international law forms part of each domestic legal system -
the Nuremberg Principles,2 2 the defence of superior orders, the Hague
Regulations,2" the Geneva Protocol of 1925,24 the Genocide Convention 2 5
military manuals setting out the recognized duties of the armed forces,26
and issues of personal criminal responsibility, among others.
B. International Law
It will suffice to observe that a strong argument can be set up under
each of the various sources of international law as enumerated in Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,27 namely:
1. international conventions;
2. international customs;
3. general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
4. judicial decisions; and
5. the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.
A brief note ensues on each of these matters, but for more detailed
information the reader is referred to the more specialized writings on the
subject.
1. International Conventions
This heading refers to treaties. There is no specific treaty expressly
recognizing the general principle that the use, manufacture or possession
of nuclear weapons is illegal. However, such a general principle is argua-
bly implicit in many treaties. The principal treaty in international law,
the Charter of the United Nations,28 states in Article I that the purposes
of the United Nations are inter alia:
1. To maintain international peace and security and to that end to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace ... and to bring about by peaceful means and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjust-
22. The Nuremberg Principles, supra note 8.
23. See Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The
Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
24. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No.
8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. [hereinafter Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925].
25. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
26. See, e.g., DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956); DEPT.
OF THE AIR FORCE, AEP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
AIR OPERATIONS (1976).
27. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38 (1), 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.
28. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, reprinted in 59 Stat. 1031.
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ment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
It is arguable that the nuclear weapons enterprise stands in direct
contradiction to these purposes. For example, it is implicit that the mea-
sures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace must be law-
ful measures under international law. If there are other principles, the
U.N. Charter is the corpus of international law which makes the nuclear
weapons enterprise unlawful (e.g., on the basis that it is more destructive
than even the crime of genocide and therefore a crime under international
law). Likewise, it is arguable that the nuclear weapons enterprise is itself
a direct negation of the principle of equality among nations.
The Declaration on Friendly Relations29 among states, which is
looked upon as containing principles which are a generally accepted inter-
pretation of the provisions of the Charter, provides that every state has
the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under the generally recog-
nized principles and rules of international law.
For lack of a general treaty outlawing nuclear weapons, the world has
been forced back upon a series of piecemeal treaties such as the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,30 the Antarctic Treaty of 1961,"' and
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear
Weapons Tests of 1974."s It is the submission of this writer that we do
not need treaties to reach the principle that nuclear weapons are illegal
whether in their use, possession or manufacture. The necessary principles
for this purpose are already contained in the pre-existing body of interna-
tional law.
We need also to bear in mind such treaties as the Genocide Conven-
tion, 3 which makes the extermination of human life on a lesser scale than
nuclear destruction a crime against humanity, and the Geneva Gas Proto-
col of 1925,1" which prohibits chemical agents of warfare - whether solid,
liquid or gaseous - whose toxic effect on people, animals or plants would
be contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law. It is
quite possible to argue by analogy that nuclear weapons stand con-
29. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 337, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
30. NPT, supra note 12.
31. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S.
71.
32. Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Treaty, July 3, 1974, U.S. Dep't of State,
Press Release No. 281 (July 3, 1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 906 (1974) (unratified). See also
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, May 28, 1976, U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament
Agency, Pub. No. 87 (May 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 891 (1976) (unratified).
33. Genocide Convention, supra note 25.
34. Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, supra note 24.
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demned upon any reasonable construction of such international treaties.
2. International Custom
The greatest strength of the argument against nuclear weapons
comes from the principles of international customary law.3 These go
back to many cultures - Judaic, Christian, Islamic, Hindu - in all of
which principles have long been recognized that there is a limit to the
suffering that can be inflicted for purposes of war. Hyperdestructive
weapons and weapons that inflict unnecessary suffering have long been
condemned. The following principles of international law are available:
(a) the principle against causation of indiscriminate harm to combat-
ants and non-combatants;
(b) the principle against aggravation of pain and suffering;
(c) the principle of proportionality;
(d) the principle against destruction of or damage to neutral states;
(e) the principle against extermination of populations;
(f) the principle that damage should not be caused to future
generations;
(g) the principle against permanent environmental damage; and
(h) the basic principles of human rights.
It can be argued also that the arguments commonly adduced in justi-
fication of nuclear war are inapplicable. These are:
(a) abrogation of international law by contrary practice;
(b) the necessities of war;
(c) practical military strategy;
(d) the concept of a just war;
(e) self-defense;
(f) the preservation of one's way of life; and
(g) preventing destabilization of areas of influence.
The argument extends from the use of nuclear weapons to their man-
ufacture and possession through a consideration of:
(a) the impracticality and the illegality of deterrence;
(b) the impossibility of a contained nuclear war;
(c) the unpredictability of the outbreak of war;
(d) the unpredictability of the course of nuclear war; and
35. See, e.g., A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); P.
TROOBOFF, LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE 24-25 (1975).
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(e) the uncontrollability of nuclear war, once commenced.
Through such considerations it is possible to demonstrate that there
is a sufficient reservoir of principles available under customary interna-
tional law to establish the illegality and indeed criminality of nuclear war.
3. General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations
If the contentions set out earlier are correct, this head can also be
invoked. For example, genocide and, a fortiori, nuclear extermination and
ecocide, would offend such general principles of international law. It
would even be possible to argue that nuclear weapons in their use, manu-
facture or possession contravene the principle of jus cogens (for example,
certain compelling norms of international law universally recognized as
being incapable of being overridden even by express agreement to the
contrary).
4. Decisions of Courts
We have not yet had an authoritative decision from a major interna-
tional court upholding the illegality of nuclear weapons. Certain national
courts such as the Tokyo Court in the Shimoda case have so held, but we
urgently need a judgement from a high ranking international court. For
this reason, it is of vital importance that IALANA proceed with one of its
projects - obtaining a referral of this question to the ICJ for an Advisory
Opinion.
5. Juristic Writings
Unlike a decade ago, we today have a considerable volume of writing
from highly respected international jurists on the illegality of nuclear war.
It is true there are contrary views, but it may fairly be said that the
weight of juristic opinion today is in favor of the view of illegality. It may
also fairly be said that the writings of the opposite school of jurists do not
contain adequate answers to some of the principle contentions advanced
in favor of the view of illegality, such as those outlined above.
The connection set out earlier in this paper - that there are suffi-
cient principles of international law already in existence pointing to ille-
gality - can be amply sustained. It is time now to bring those principles
into operation rather than permit them to continue to lie dormant. With
their assistance it can reasonably be expected that the obstacles
presented by the real world to the outlawing of nuclear weapons can be
overcome. We must not be browbeaten any longer by "realities," for
many of them can indeed be changed under pressure of the congruence of
anti-nuclear forces and factors at this time in history. The law has
achieved dramatic results in past eras of human history, upsetting appar-
ently changeless structures and attitudes that have prevailed from the
beginning of time. It can do so again in the greatest challenge humanity
has ever faced.
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It seems clear that the next round in the battle against nuclear weap-
ons must be fought by lawyers. They have weapons at their disposal
which other groups cannot match. It is for us at this convention to urge
the legal professions of the world to rise to their responsibilities and to
use these weapons which at present lie rusting in their legal armories.
